Advice to Iraq War Hawks
Declare victory and accept defeat. I’ve given up on the idea that hard core Iraq war hawks will ever admit that the policy has been a fiasco. They will not acknowledge the horror the misbegotten war has caused, how it has weakened the US, lost ground in the true war on terror, and gave aid and comfort to Islamic extremists. They will not truly accept that they have undercut the very political party most of them support, not only making it impossible for the GOP to pursue its domestic policy but now all but assuring long term Democratic rule.
A few might privately admit it but refuse to admit publicly that it was a mistake. They don’t want to admit that the deaths were in vain, that the suffering caused to American troops and their families (let alone the Iraqis) was unnecessary. They want to hold on to the fiction that the war has been honorable. Some, especially Vietnam vets unable to make peace with the futility of that war, may think they owe it to today’s soldiers to make it seem as if the conflict had value. Yet, with Prime Minister Nouri Maliki calling for a time table on Iraq, it’s becoming clear that Iraq is unwilling to give the US the long term presence the Bush administration hoped for, and in fact Iraq is likely to be emerge close to Iran, strengthening our true rival in the region. The public clearly wants out, and is prepared to elect a President who will not want to stay in Iraq.
So the pro-war crowd can either acknowledge reality (some have, to be sure), or they can find a way to try to save face: act is if this all was a success. How can they do it?
First, try to claim that this was a war against al qaeda in Iraq, and point to the success in weakening that group. That’s a very dubious and disingenuous argument, given that al qaeda only came to Iraq after we invaded, but given the short attention span of many Americans, it might work for some. It’s also clear that al qaeda in Iraq was always very weak, a tiny portion of the insurgency. Things got better when the US gave up trying to defeat the Sunni insurgents. Instead, we gave in to them, allowed them to keep their militias and avoid penetration by the central Iraqi government. They then turned on al qaeda, which was never a true threat to take power in Iraq.
Second, claim the Sunnis are on board with the new Iraq. They aren’t; they don’t trust the central government, they control things in their own regions, and they maintain their militias. Yet in exchange for that they agree not to fight against the Shi’ites or rekindle the 2006 civil war (which was about the central government failing to extend such control). That’s a loss for the US policy goal, but because they’re not fighting, well, people might believe that little lie.
Third, claim that Shi’ite militants are weakened, and al Sadr isn’t a problem. Al Sadr is no weaker now than in 2005, he’s always been strong only in a few regions. And he is still relevant, and connected to both Iran and, ironically, Maliki. He’s playing a game designed to get the US out, and his pressure is one reason why Maliki wants a time table. Yet ridiculing al Sadr and mocking him can create the illusion he’s been defeated, and the hawks really are playing for illusions now. This also means ignoring that in Shi’ite areas women are far worse off than under Saddam, that militias still provide most security, and religious police are all over the place, inforcing a strict moral code. That also requires ignoring Iran’s penetration of both the Iraqi government and existing militia groups. But Americans aren’t paying attention.
The pro war hawks who want to save face have to avoid talking about the war in cost-benefit terms. There are few if any benefits, and immense costs. Even the CIA think al qaeda in general is stronger now than in 2001, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the real terrorists lurk, the US has seen conditions deteriorate over the last year. Certainly the Iraq war, which turned out to be rather meaningless if costly, diverted attention from those battles. They have to somehow focus on Saddam being gone as “good,” and ignore the price that achieving that good cost (at a much lower price we could take out Mugabe, but few people are calling for that!)
However, if Americans really want to learn from this fiasco, and avoid repeating it, these face saving lies should be rejected. Iraq is neo-imperialism gone bad. It was a desire to project US power in a way that was supposed to cause fundamental change in the region towards democracy and markets. Instead, it accomplished nothing of value for the US, and has left numerous orphans, widows and dead civilians in Iraq. In the US, there is the obscene site of “pro-military” folk defending a policy which was unnecessary, but has led to mental illness, suicide, divorce, broken families, domestic and child abuse, and long term mental illness as many soldiers were forced back for numerous tours of duty. That was to save face for an administration which did not want to admit their errors.
I am cautiously optimistic that this nightmare is almost over for Americans. We will be paying the price for decades, however. I am less optimistic about the future for Iraqis, whose children have grown up with violence all around them, and whose society remains divided and thoroughly corrupt. I don’t think most Americans truly appreciate the moral bankruptcy of our Iraq policy; I think people are so taken by the mythology of war and militarism that they don’t comprehend the scope of the horror we’ve inflicted. Even violence not done directly by us took place because of conditions we put in place.
I wrote yesterday about the 90s as a decade of illusions. The Iraq war this decade was based on the most malicious and dangerous kind of delusion: that choosing to kill and destroy without provocation can lead to better conditions. This illusion has been shattered as well. We will pay a price, but if we reject the self-serving attempts by the pro-war crowd to save face and star into reality with a cold, clear conscience, we can learn something from this to prevent us from taking that path again. And if Iraq war hawks want to engage in honest self-reflection about their motives and assumptions, perhaps they’ll realize that it’s worse to lose reason than to lose face.
